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ABSTRACT 
The ‘later’ James Gibson is widely misrepresented as an extreme stimulus-
response theorist. In fact, Gibson’s 1966 book presents a radical alternative to 
stimulus-response theory. “Perceptual systems” are not passive and 
receptive, but “organs of active attention” (1966/1968, p. 58). Perceivers 
“reach out” into the world. This commentary examines some of the 
implications of Gibson’s systems-cum-functionalist-cum-ecological approach, 
including the relations between the senses, the concept of ‘sensationless’ 
perception, and most fundamentally, the nature of perceptual systems as 
extending beyond the body. I conclude that an adequate understanding of 
perception cannot be limited to the already severely limited domain of 
psychology. If Gibson is right, “ecological psychology” is a contradiction in 
terms. 
 
Key Words: J. J. Gibson, radical subjectivism, stimulus-response theory, 
bottom-up theory, top-down theory, John Dewey, interdisciplinarity 
  
 3 
1966 AND ALL THAT: JAMES GIBSON AND BOTTOM-DOWN THEORY.1 
By showing the passive nature of vision, [Kepler’s eye-camera 
analogy] cut the ground from under a vast set of theories … which 
assume vision to be an “active function”, a reaching out, as it were, of 
the soul. (Santillana, 1959, p. 36; see also Straker, 1976, p. 21) 
EMPIRICISM AND EXPERIENCE 
Empirical science keeps painting itself into a corner, and coming up with self-
consuming arguments. The standard claim has been that, on the basis of 
empirical evidence, we must conclude that things are never as they seem. 
Here is Arthur Eddington, in his book The Nature of the Physical World 
(1935), setting up the idea of “two worlds.” According to Eddington, there are, 
for example, two completely different tables. The first is the table we 
experience as substantial, tangible, and meaningful as a table, and the 
second is the alien “scientific table.” The scientific table, according to 
Eddington “is mostly emptiness,” and completely alien to our experience: 
I need not tell you that modern physics has by delicate test and 
remorseless logic assured me that my second scientific table is the 
only one which is really there - wherever ‘there’ may be. (Eddington, 
1935, p. 6; for a brilliant rejoinder, see Susan Stebbing, 1937!) 
James Gibson read Eddington as a student and admitted that it had been 
completely taken him in. “It took me years to get over it” (Gibson, 1967, p. 
172; see also Gibson, 1966/1968, pp. 21-22). 
This “two-worlds” thinking has profoundly structured perceptual theory, and in 
a thoroughly disastrous way. Kepler attempted to provide a mechanical 
explanation of vision but it was an explanation that emphatically stopped at 
the stage of the formation of the retinal image, thus setting up entirely different 
kinds of ‘psychological’ questions – and possible answers - about what 
happens beyond the retina (Crombie, 1964).1  
                                                        
1 Thanks to Endre Kadar, Ann Richards, and the reviewers for very helpful 
comments. 
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Two-stage theories have a very long history, and have been based on the 
concept of a passively received, inchoate, ‘sensory core’ that has to be 
embellished by ‘the intellect’ to be rendered coherent and meaningful (Hatfield 
& Epstein, 1979). The problem, of course, has been how the intellect could 
possibly ‘reach out’ beyond the sensory core.  One ‘solution’ has been to 
appeal to the power of inference: 
That the information obtained through the eye consists of two things —
sensations, and inferences from those sensations: that the sensations 
are merely colours variously arranged, and changes of colour; that all 
else is inference, the work of the intellect, not of the eye … . (J. S. Mill, 
1842, p. 322) 
But inferences need premises, and these premises could never have been 
based on past experience, either of the individual or the species. For, 
according to the very assumptions of such inference theories, the relation 
between perceiver and world was no different - and, hence, no less dire - in 
the past.  
The favoured alternative account in modern psychology has been that 
perception is based upon the construction of cognitive representations. Yet 
the same problem arises. Here is Richard Gregory relishing in what he 
presents as a firmly empirically grounded argument for radical subjectivism: 
It used to be thought that perceptions, by vision and touch and so on, 
can give direct knowledge of objective reality. ... But, largely through the 
physiological study of the senses over the last two hundred years, this 
has become ever more difficult to defend. ... ultimately we cannot know 
directly what is illusion, any more than truth for we cannot step outside 
perception to compare experience with objective reality. (Gregory, 1989, 
p. 94; emphasis added.) 
Gregory is not alone in wanting to have it both ways: claiming that we can 
indeed know what things are like (namely, when we are doing science), only 
to conclude, on that very basis, that in general we cannot. Wyburn, Pickford, 
& Hirst (1964) set out several fundamental objections to representationalism, 
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including the following: 
... many versions of [Representative] theory are self-refuting. In the 
early part of the exposition, when the causal transmission is being 
established, it seems assumed that we can directly observe objects, 
sense organs, nerves, and brains, and so can observe causal 
processes outside the mind; but by the time the conclusion is reached 
all we can perceive are mental representations, so that the “brains,” 
“nerves,” etc., directly observed and described in the early stages 
must, it seems, have been mental representations only, and the causal 
relations observed must have been between such representations. The 
theory has “cut off the branch on which it was sitting” by disallowing the 
direct perception of objects in the external world on which its premises 
rested. (Wyburn, Pickford, & Hirst, 1964, p. 253; see also Anscombe, 
1974, Kenny, 1971, Hacker,1991; Wilcox & Katz, 1984.) 
All this radical subjectivism, apparently underpinned by science itself, has a 
kind of plausibility when we think of science as something all over and done 
with.  But, science is something people actually do, and are still doing. It is a 
human activity. Curiously, psychologists, of all people, seldom notice this 
when they theorize about ‘scientific method’ and keep proposing an ideal of 
scientific objectivity that would exclude the subjectivity of scientists. A few 
physicists, however, such as Richard Feynman, have noticed: 
[Feynman] believed that historians, journalists, and scientists 
themselves all participated in a tradition of writing about science that 
obscured the working reality, the sense of science as a process rather 
than a body of formal results. (Gleick, 1992, p. 380.) 
So, mental representationalism leaves us with two big problems. First, how do 
people do science – including psychology?  Second, how do people, in 
general, along with other animals, actually manage to live in the world? 
The phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, came very close to the nub of this 
issue: 
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There are all sorts of problems that stem from the naïveté, according to 
which objectivist science holds what it calls the objective world to be 
the totality of what is, without paying any attention to the fact that no 
objective science can do justice to the subjectivity that achieves 
science. (Husserl, 1965, p. 185) 
GIBSON 1950 AND 1979 
James Gibson acknowledged that his teacher at Princeton, Edwin B. Holt, had 
been an inspiration. Holt set out powerful arguments against representational 
theory long before the rise of modern cognitive theory. His targets were 
representationalism, not so much in psychology (where, in Holt’s time it was 
not so dominant) but primarily in the philosophy of science (see Costall, 
2011). Gibson made very few references to Holt’s criticism of 
representationalism, but did protest against radical subjectivism within social 
and clinical psychology in his early writings. An important concern in his early 
1950 classic, The Perception of the Visual World was social stereotyping, 
including witch-hunts - to which Gibson was himself subject during the attacks 
against ‘un-American activities’ (see Reed, 1988, pp. 106-113).   
Gibson’s political and ethical concerns are very clear in his early work, 
including the rise of European fascism (Gibson, 1939). But one big problem 
with his first book is that it is primarily about defining a “literal perception” of 
visible surfaces (“the visible world”) that is supposed to provide a safe retreat 
from cultural and political relativism (Costall & Still, 1989; Costall, 1995).  
In a now largely forgotten chapter on meaning towards the end of book, 
Gibson insists that it is meanings not the surfaces of things that are 
fundamental: 
… ’use-meanings’ have to be regarded from a biological viewpoint as 
primary, in contrast to the standard topics of perceptual research: the 
shapes, colours, motions and distance of things (Gibson 1950, p.198; 
see also Gibson 1959, p. 485). 
However, I think it is fair to say that in this first book, Gibson leaves the 
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relation between meaning and surfaces hanging in the air: 
Meanings and spatial properties are not entirely separable from one 
another; meaning is not entirely detachable from color, form, and 
texture. Symbolic meanings, however, seem to be detachable from 
their objects and are presumably learned. (Gibson, 1950, p. 211; 
emphasis added) 
The 1950 book not only treats vision largely as a self-contained sense, it is 
also a resolute attempt to consolidate stimulus-response theory in a way that 
would eliminate any need to appeal to inferences or representations (see also 
Gibson 1959). Gibson was not alone in this project. Gibson took part in a 
conference at Cornell bringing together a range of international researchers 
engaged in the same project. The aim was to redefine the stimulus as a 
higher-order, spatiotemporal structure (Hochberg, 1957). As Gibson put it: 
Gestalt theory denied any one-to-one correspondence between the 
stimulation of receptors and the experience which resulted. The 
assumption of such a fixed correspondence was called the “constancy 
hypothesis.” . . . The aim of this chapter is to reassert the constancy 
hypothesis on the basis of a broader conception of stimulation. 
(Gibson, 1950, p. 62) 
Although Gibson’s last book (Gibson, 1979) is fundamentally different from his 
1950 book, it was initially intended to be an up-date of that earlier book,2 and 
it is perhaps for this reason that it suffers from its two main limitations: an 
(almost) exclusive emphasis on vision (but see pp. 200 & 253), and, once 
again, an awkward switching back and forth between the perception of 
surfaces and meaning (Costall & Still, 1989).  
1968 AND ALL THAT 
Gibson’s middle book, The senses considered as perceptual systems (1966) 
(SCAPS) was published in Britain in 1968, and, remarkably, when I was a 
student, Tim Miles, my professor, gave us an assignment to review the whole 
book shortly after it appeared. 
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SCAPS, although the least cited, is Gibson’s best book. I had moved from 
physics to psychology because I had become puzzled by the way scientists 
keep undermining “the conditions of possibility” of doing science. In moving 
into psychology, I had wrongly expected that the science of psychology, in 
general, would provide a more robust account of experience and subjectivity 
than the radically subjectivized version that had been constructed within the 
“metaphysics of modern physical science” (Burtt, 1923/1954). Gibson’s 
approach (as soon became clear to me when reviewing his book) was an 
exception. 
The title of Gibson’s book refers to “systems theory” but there is no real 
discussion of what this entails, nor any reference even to its main exponent, 
von Bertalanffy (e.g. 1933/1962).  Gibson is just a bit more forthcoming about 
the systems approach in his 1979 book: “What psychology needs is the kind 
of thinking that is beginning to be attempted in what is loosely called systems 
thinking” (p. 2). 
SCAPS marks a fundamental break with the tradition of mechanical science. 
The book should be understood in relation to a wider development in 
biological thought: 
Function [within traditional science] was considered to be subordinate 
to structure; one started with the anatomic organ and looked for its 
specific function. … The unit of investigation was the visible anatomical 
element, and the preferred method was that of dissection. 
The situation changed drastically with a development that was as much 
a change in the object of investigation as a change of method. … Thus 
it was no longer the function of a specific organ, like the stomach, 
which was at issue, but the role of the stomach in a function like 
nutrition. Structures were now subordinated to general functions that 
involved the interplay of many organs and systems. (Danziger, 1990, 
25-26) 
As Gibson himself put it: 
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The anatomical aspect of a perceptual apparatus is only one of 
several; it also has functional aspects. The same anatomy can be used 
on different occasions in different ways. … [perceptual systems are 
not] anatomical units capable of being dissected out of the body. 
(Gibson, 1966/1968, pp. 56-58) 
For example, if we bring something close to our eyes to inspect it more 
carefully, then our hand becomes part of our visual system, and when we 
move around in the world, our legs, too, become part of the visual system – 
as does our movement in the world. 
SCAPS also stressed that we are not exclusively visual beings.3  Gibson 
(1966/1968, p. 54) quotes, approvingly, Erich von Hornbostel: 
It matters little through which sense I realize that in the dark I have blundered 
into a pig-sty. (von  Hornbostel, 1927, 83) 
However, it is not just that the senses are more or less interchangeable: they are 
more or less unified. In fact, one of the most interesting developments within the 
ecological approach to perception has been the identification of informative 
structures that do not merely involve the ‘integration’ of the senses, but the 
pickup of information that is essentially transmodal.4 This research (along with 
other important considerations) challenges the influential “law of specific nerve 
energies” (i.e. each sense gives rise to its own specific kinds of sensations) as 
having little, if any, relevance to our understanding of “natural perception.” 
Another, important aspect of SCAPS is Gibson’s new radical move against the 
“stimulus-response” approach. Yet, the later Gibson is consistently 
misrepresented as a bottom-up theorist (and much else besides!; see Costall & 
Morris, 2015): 
An influential and controversial theorist . . . is James Gibson (904 –1980) 
[sic], whose theory of direct perception truly defines the bottom-up 
approach. (Sternberg, 2003, p. 127) 
Gibson’s essentially passive account is very different from the notion in this 
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book [Gregory’s Eye and brain], that perceptions are constructed 
hypotheses. (Gregory, 1997, p. 9; emphasis in the original)5 
In fact, SCAPS kicks against the covert commitment to stimulus-response 
thinking that continues to prevail within cognitivist psychology: it is taken for 
granted that we are bodily passive to the world, and that it is just internal 
‘cognitive processing’ that is active. As Gibson stressed in SCAPS, the 
senses are active systems of exploration: “The active senses … are 
analogous to tentacles and feelers” (Gibson, 1966/1968, p. 5; see also 
Gibson, 1962, on “active touch”). And Gibson could not have been clearer 
about his rejection of S-R theory: “The observer who is awake and alert does 
not wait passively for stimuli to impinge upon his receptors” (1966/1968, p. 
32); “percepts are not responses to stimuli” (Gibson, 1975/1982, p. 411); “The 
ecological approach to perception was adopted in my book, The Senses 
Considered as Perceptual Systems … Actually it is a new approach to the 
whole field of psychology for it involves rejecting the stimulus-response 
formula” (Gibson, 1979, p. 2). 
Gibson’s move beyond stimulus-response theory had already been set out in 
a much earlier work with Crooks in 1938 on car driving. Harry Heft has 
explained the important implications of this article: 
The kind of analysis Gibson and Crooks offered differs from the 
standard behavioristic analysis in several interrelated ways: First, 
action occurs within a field of objects and can only be adequately 
understood when examined with respect to their combined influences.  
As such, action in everyday settings requires more than a linear S-R 
causal analysis. In fact, it involves more than simply moving from single 
to multiple causation; it entails a somewhat different take on the notion 
of causality itself. A field theoretic approach proposes that 
environmental features constrain and channel goal-directed behavior 
rather than provoke or elicit it ... . (Heft, 2001, 213-214; emphasis 
added) 
This recognition of perceivers, or, more fundamentally, agents (Costall, 2003), 
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as not only active in their heads but also in the world, even occurs in Gibson’s 
somewhat later writings at a time when he was explicitly promoting a 
psychophysical (S-R) approach to perception: 
The normal human being, however, is active. … If he is not walking or 
driving a car or looking from a train or airplane, his ordinary 
adjustments of posture will produce some change in the position of his 
eyes in space. Such changes will modify the retinal images in a quite 
specific way. (J. J. Gibson, 1950, p. 117.) 
The limited options of bottom-up or top-down theory have, in modern 
psychology, been presented as the only ‘games in town.’ But they each 
presume that the perceiver/agent is bodily passive to the world. These limited 
options go back a long way, to attempts to mechanize, in a broken-backed 
way, how we experience things. Here is Kepler’s version from 1604: 
In what manner this image or picture is brought together by the visual 
spirits which reside in the retina or in the nerves, and whether it is 
made to appear before the soul or tribunal of the faculty of vision by a 
spirit within the cerebral chambers, or whether the faculty of vision, as 
a magistrate sent by the soul, goes out from the council chamber of the 
brain to meet this image in the optic nerves and retina descending to a 
lower court, these things I leave to the natural philosophers .. for 
disputing. For the equipment of the opticians does not allow them to 
proceed any farther than that opaque wall which occurs first in the eye. 
(cited in Straker, 1976, p. 21) 
By insisting that we, and other animals, are active ‘beings in the world,’ 
Gibson broke away from the limited options of bottoms-up and tops-down. 
From that point on, he was no longer a bottom-up theorist. He was, if 
anything, a bottom-down theorist.6 
TIM MILES (1923-2008) 
Long after I had written my student review of SCAPS I discovered that my 
teacher, Tim Miles, had written a highly insightful review of the book: 
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This is a very exciting book. … What is of interest in the case of 
pseudo-problems about perception is not their recognition but their 
unraveling – the detailed working out of what is wrong with a particular 
formulation and why.7 Gibson’s central thesis is such that it disposes 
en bloc of a large number of these pseudo-problems and shows how 
they are all a product of the same mistake, that of regarding the 
sensory nerves as transmitters of different qualities of sensation. In 
addition his arguments show that some of the traditional sceptical 
doubts are quite unfounded. (Miles, 1970, p. 145-146) 
As he went on to point out, Gibson was engaging in serious philosophical 
issues: 
… an incidental by-product of the book is to make one hesitant about 
making a hard and fast distinction between “philosophical” questions 
about perception and “psychological” ones. (Miles,1970, p. 146) 
Exceptionally, in British psychology courses, Tim Miles’ lectures drew upon 
the work of Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin, and their scepticism about the 
scientific foundations of psychology. (Gibson himself cites Austin at the 
beginning of SCAPS, p. xv.) Tim Miles published his review of SCAPS in 
Mind, a journal originally set up in the nineteenth century to bring together 
philosophy and the new psychology. Unfortunately, this link has long since 
collapsed in that journal but also much more widely. Yet psychology does 
need to reconnect with philosophy (though not, of course, Fodor, Dennett, et 
al.) and also, as I shall now argue, much else besides. 
THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO WHAT? 
Gibson’s approach calls into question existing disciplinary categories, 
including psychology itself. Perceptual systems extend beyond the limits of 
the body. For this reason, they challenge the traditional divisions between 
disciplines, and the very coherence of psychology as a self-contained project. 
Here is Edwin Holt, Gibson’s teacher, getting to the point: 
In order to understand what the organism is doing, you will just miss 
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the essential point if you look inside the organism. For the organism, 
while a very interesting mechanism in itself, is one whose movements 
turn on objects outside of itself, much as the orbit of the earth turns 
upon the sun; and these external, and sometimes very distant, objects 
are as much constituents of the behavior process as is the organism 
which does the turning. It is this pivotal other object, the object of 
specific response, which seems to me to have been overneglected. 
(Holt, 1915, p. 55; see also Palmer, 2004, on the “transdermal”) 
John Dewey, an early critic of the stimulus-response formula (Dewey, 1896),8 
was well aware of the need to think in terms of connections rather than 
divisions of scientific labour in order to understand the nature of human 
nature: 
Human nature exists and operates in an environment. And it is not "in" 
that environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight 
and soil. It is of them, continuous with their energies, dependent upon 
their support … . Hence physics, chemistry, history, statistics, 
engineering science, are a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far 
as they enable us to understand the conditions and agencies through 
which man lives … (Dewey, 1922, p. 296 ; emphasis added.) 
Psychology, unfortunately, has largely been in the business of making 
disconnections in order to hold onto its own distinctive ‘subject.’ The qualifier 
“ecological” in the term “ecological psychology” has hardly marked a decisive 
change in direction. Much ‘ecological’ research has been laboratory based, 
and used abstracted experimental paradigms. There has also been a failure 
to connect with other relevant developments both within and beyond 
psychology, such as situated action, ethnomethodology, social anthropology, 
and innovations in biological thought, e.g. developmental systems theory, 
niche construction and ‘evo-devo.’ The ecological approach needs to be 
worldly. It might even, as Gibson proposed, try to connect with “the powerful 
movement” of environmentalism (1979, p. 2). 
To repeat, psychology, historically and institutionally, has tried to define for 
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itself a highly restricted domain as its subject of study. So, for a long time, I 
have been getting increasingly uneasy about the term “ecological 
psychology.” Gibson’s systems-cum-functional-cum-ecological approach 
implies that we should be making connections big time. If SCAPS is right, 
then “ecological psychology” sounds to me like a contradiction in terms. In 
fact, Gibson never used this term at all in SCAPS, nor in his later Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception (1979).9 
Of course, we can, in principle, as one of the reviewers of this commentary 
rightly commented, re-define “psychology” any way we choose (as indeed did 
Gibson, 1979, p. 7). But, unfortunately, psychology is studied by psychologists 
and, in the end, they are the problem. As Gibson himself did not hesitate to 
point out, they - we?! - are simply not up to the job: 
Psychologists are simply, on an absolute scale, dullards. … They are 
prosperous. Most of them seem to be busily applying psychology to 
problems of life and personality. They seem to feel, many of them, that 
all we need to do is consolidate our scientific gains. Their self-
confidence astonishes me. For these gains seem to me puny, and 
scientific psychology seems to me ill-founded. At any time the whole 
psychological applecart might be upset. Let them beware! (Gibson, 
1967, p. 142) 
The ecological approach is potentially one of the very best games in town. But 
an ecological psychology free of psychologists is not on the cards. We need 
to hold on dearly to the ecological approach, but an ecological approach to 
what? 
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1 Crombie, an historian of science, celebrates this awkward juxtaposition of 
mechanism and mentalism as a scientific breakthrough. 
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3 Gibson nevertheless still characterized vision as “the queen of the senses” 
(Gibson, 1966/1968, p. 163). 
4 The term “amodal” which is now widely used in this context is potentially 
misleading, given that Michotte long ago coined it to mean something 
completely different (Thinès, Costall, & Butterworth, 2014). 
5 Both Sternberg and Gregory knew James and Eleanor Gibson well, so it is 
puzzling that they could get things so badly wrong, and, in the case of 
Sternberg, even the date of Gibson’s death. 
6 Mainstream cognitive psychology is widely misunderstood to be a radical 
alternative to stimulus-response psychology.  As the textbooks shamelessly 
boast (while, at the same time touting cognitive theory’s radical credentials), it 
is a variant - an attempt to explain ‘what goes on’ between the stimulus and 
response (Hamlyn, 1981, p. 115; Reed, 1997, pp. 266-7). 
7 This is how Gibson (1979, p. 116) himself put this point: “Psychology is 
plagued with efforts to find answers to the wrong questions!” 
8 As the late Steinar Kvale put it to me, a prescient critic. 
9 Although Gibson described himself as a psychologist (1966, p. 22), he 
makes surprisingly few explicit references to psychology at all, and these are 
generally negative. See Gibson (1966/1968): pp. vii, 3, 28, 39, 106, 204, 222, 
263, 266-7, 276, 277, 283, 300, 311; Gibson (1979): pp, 2, 39, 42, 56, 96, 
134, 135, 138, 139, 147, 220, 234, 255, 268, 293. 
